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The Development of Theory of Mind
and Positive and Negative
Reciprocity in Preschool Children
Joanna Schug1*, Haruto Takagishi2, Catalina Benech1 and Hiroyuki Okada3
1 Department of Psychology, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA, USA, 2 Brain Science Institute, Tamagawa
University, Tokyo, Japan, 3 Department of Engineering, Tamagawa University, Tokyo, Japan
This study examined the relation between the acquisition of false-beliefs theory of
mind (ToM) and reciprocity in preschoolers. Preschool-aged children completed a task
assessing the understanding of false beliefs, and played an Ultimatum Game (UG) with
another child in a face-to-face setting. Negative reciprocity was assessed by examining
the rejection of unfair offers made by another child in the UG, while positive reciprocity
was assessed by examining allocations made by participants in a Dictator Game (DG)
following the UG. The results indicated that children who had passed a task assessing
first-order false beliefs were more likely to make generous offers in a DG following a fair
offer made by their partner in a proceeding UG, but that false beliefs ToM was unrelated
to the rejection of unfair offers in the UG.
Keywords: economic games, reciprocity, theory of mind, preschoolers
INTRODUCTION
Reciprocity plays a very important role in the maintenance of human society (Axelrod, 1986;
Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Gintis, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, 2004), and is observed in
every human culture (Gouldner, 1960). Individuals can engage in reciprocity either by responding
to a positive action with another positive action, or responding to a negative action with a likewise
negative action. These two types of reciprocity are known respectively as positive and negative
reciprocity. For example, the act of returning a favor would be considered to be positive reciprocity,
while punishing criminals for crimes committed would be an example of negative reciprocity.
Overall, research suggests that positive and negative reciprocity (and related concepts such
as reward and punishment) may function as independent cognitive mechanisms. A number
of studies using behavioral experiments (e.g., Yamagishi et al., 2012), large scale panel data
(Egloff et al., 2013), and evolutionary game theory (Szolnoki and Perc, 2013) have suggested
that positive and negative reciprocity are distinct and often completely uncorrelated processes.
Based on this evidence suggesting that negative and positive reciprocity employ distinct cognitive
underpinnings, we sought to examine whether the development of cognitive abilities associated
with the understanding of intentions would differentially associate with positive and negative
reciprocity in preschool children.
A number of studies have examined factors necessary to create reciprocity, both positive and
negative, in interpersonal interactions. One factor which has been found to be very important
is intentions (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), or whether one attributes the cause of
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an individual’s behavior to their intent of goodwill or malice.
People attempt to understand the intentions of others and
respond to these intentions in turn by responding altruistically
toward other individuals’ benevolent intentions, while punishing
and retaliating against hostile intentions. For instance, we take
into account intentions of goodwill before we decide to return
acts of kindness (McCabe et al., 2003), and in many judicial
systems the severity of punishments for different crimes will
relate to the intentions of the perpetrator: the unintentional
killing of a man will result in a charge of manslaughter, compared
with first-degree murder for an intentional killing.
Thus far, experimental studies have provided clear support
for intention-based models of reciprocity (Blount, 1995; Falk
et al., 2003, 2008; Ohmura and Yamagishi, 2005). One research
paradigm that has been extensively used to investigate the
importance of intentions on reciprocity, and in particular
negative reciprocity, is the Ultimatum Game (UG). The UG
is an economic bargaining game widely used to examine the
preference for fairness (Güth et al., 1982). The UG is played
by two players; the first player, known as the allocator, is
given a lump sum of money from the experimenter and is
offered the chance to divide this amount between themselves
and a second player, known as the responder. The responder
then is given the choice of accepting or rejecting the offer.
If the responder accepts the proposer’s offer, both players
receive the amounts allocated by the first player. However,
if the responder rejects the allocation, both parties receive
nothing. Thus, rejection in the UG can be thought of as a
type of negative reciprocity, in which unfair behavior can be
punished.
The ability to make attributions regarding the intentions
behind behavior has been found to be extremely important in
facilitating reciprocal behavior (Blount, 1995; Falk et al., 2003,
2008; Ohmura and Yamagishi, 2005). Blount (1995) used the
UG to investigate whether attributions of intention play a role
in negative reciprocity. She compared rejection of unfair offers
in an UG in three conditions, a traditional UG in which the
first player divides the money between him or herself and the
other player, a third part condition in which a neutral third
party made the proposal, and a random condition, in which
the proposal was purportedly made via a roulette. The results
of this study showed that UG responders were significantly
more likely to reject unfair offers in the intention treatment
than in the non-intention treatment, suggesting that knowing
the intentions of others is an important facilitator of negative
reciprocity.
The impact of intentions also appears to impact positive
reciprocity. Falk et al. (2008) examined the impact of intentions
on both positive and negative reciprocity using a simple two-
person economic game known as the moonlighting game
(MG), which is an extension of the Investment Game (e.g.,
Berg et al., 1995), with the exception that players can
both send and take points from their partner. As in the
investment game, points allocated to the other player are
tripled. However, players in the MG may also take points from
their partner by allocating a negative amount. In this study,
participants played a repeated MG either in a treatment where
an allocator determined the allocation, or when allocations
were determined by a dice roll. The results of this study
indicated that intentions were important for both negative and
positive reciprocity: players rewarded generous behavior and
punished selfish behavior in the intention treatment, but did
not engage in any form of reciprocity in the no-intention
treatment.
Theory of Mind and Reciprocity
Understanding the intentions of others requires the ability to
infer others’ internal states. This cognitive ability is encapsulated
in the notion of theory of mind (ToM; Premack and Woodruff,
1978; Baron-Cohen, 2001; Gallagher and Frith, 2003). ToM
is a multi-faceted ability that develops across the lifespan
beginning in infancy and continuing into adulthood. One
facet of ToM that has been studied in the context of
economic behavior entails the understanding of false beliefs.
False Beliefs Theory of Mind (FB ToM; e.g., Wellman and
Liu, 2004), as assessed by passage of tasks which require
the understanding of first false beliefs [False Beliefs Task
(FBT)], typically emerges in children around 3–4 years of
age.1
Studies with preschool-aged children have indicated that FB
ToM, assessed by passage of a test assessing first-order false
beliefs, is strongly related to the propensity to propose fair offers
in an UG (Takagishi et al., 2010, 2014)2. That is, children who had
passed a FBT were more likely to make a fair offer to their partner,
while children who have not developed ToM tend to make more
selfish offers. These results support the hypothesis that children
who are able to successfully pass an assessment of FB ToM are
able to understand that another child will reject an unfair offer,
and thus make fair offers in the role of the proposer.
Passage of a FB ToM task does not appear to consistently relate
to rejection behavior in the UG. Takagishi et al. (2014) showed
that responders who were not able to pass a task assessing FB
ToM were likely to reject unfair offers, while children who had
passed a FB task were more likely to accept unfair offers. Another
study (Castelli et al., 2010) examining the relation between FB
ToM and rejections of unfair offers in an UG found that children
were more likely to reject rather than accept unfair offers even
before they were able to pass a false belief task and they were
even more likely to reject unfair offers made by a virtual human
1There is considerable controversy in the false beliefs literature regarding the
developmental time period associated with the development of the understanding
of intentions and false beliefs, and the nature of cognitive abilities measured by
FBTs typically used to assess FB ToM in preschool-aged children (see Sabbagh
et al., 2013; Helming et al., 2014). While there is a robust finding that preschool
aged children become able to pass tests assessing the development of first-order
false beliefs in others between 3 and 4 years of age (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001;
Wellman and Liu, 2004), other research shows that even infants (e.g., Onishi
and Baillargeon, 2005) have some understanding of intentions and can infer the
mental states of others. Nevertheless, preschoolers’ passage of FBTs correspond
with the development of a number of behaviors, such as lying (e.g., Talwar and
Lee, 2008) and secret keeping and playing hide-and-go-seek (Peskin and Ardino,
2003). While this debate is beyond the scope of the current study, we presume that
FB ToM reflects the development of cognitive abilities required to act upon the
understanding of intentions.
2Interestingly, second-order false beliefs, which develop later in childhood, do not
appear to relate to behavior in the UG (Castelli et al., 2014b).
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partner after acquiring FB ToM. Together, these results suggest
that the acquisition of FB ToM may not be entirely necessary for
the rejection of unfair offers in the UG.
Other studies have examined the role of development in
children’s responses to inequitable allocations to the self in
economic games. For instance, two studies (Blake and McAuliffe,
2011; Blake et al., 2015) examined the rejection of both
advantageous and disadvantageous distributions in children
between 4 and 8 years of age found that 4-year-olds were
likely to reject unfair offers which were disadvantageous toward
themselves. Another study suggests that the moderating effect
of intentions on negative reciprocity may develop late in
adolescence. Gürogˇlu et al. (2009, 2011) conducted studies
examining the impact of intentions on rejection in an UG
in 10, 13, 15, and 20 year-old participants. They found that
younger participants were more likely than older participants
to reject unfair offers even when the unfair offers were
made unintentionally. Thus, it appears that the importance of
intentions in moderating rejection behavior may develop later in
life.
In the following study, we sought to examine how the
development of ToM, which we operationalize as the
understanding of first-order false beliefs, impacts positive
and negative reciprocity. The results of previous studies suggest
that young children will frequently reject unfair offers, suggesting
that the cognitive underpinning related to FB ToM may not
be implicated in negative reciprocity, particularly in young
children. However, one study examining reciprocity, defined as
matching another player’s strategy in a repeated coordination
game, found that the tendency for children to match a jointly
beneficial allocation increased with age in a sample of children
ranging from 3 to 7.5 years of age, an age spanning the typical
development of FB ToM (House et al., 2013). Another study
found that 5 year-olds, but not 3 year-olds, adjusted their sharing
behavior in anticipation of reciprocity (Sebastián-Enesco and
Warneken, 2015). However, to the best of our knowledge no
study has explicitly examined the relationship between positive
and negative reciprocity and the development of FB ToM in
children.
A number of studies examining the development of
preferences for fairness in children have used the UG (Takagishi
et al., 2010, 2014; Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al., 2015).
However, these studies have found no evidence to suggest that the
development of FB ToM plays any role in negative reciprocity
among responders in the UG: children who had developed the
ability to understand the intentions of others were no more likely
to reject unfair offers. In fact, children who had acquired ToM
were less likely to reject unfair (unequal) UG offers, an effect
Takagishi et al. (2014) suggest may occur due to the children’s
desire to maintain harmonious relationships with their peers in
non-anonymous games. However, the UG by itself is not well-
adapted for examining both positive and negative reciprocity.
While the rejection of unfair offers in an UG can be regarded as
negative reciprocity or punishment, accepting fair offers cannot
be simply regarded as positive reciprocity, as accepting behavior
may be motivated purely by self-interest rather than reciprocal
motives.
In order to examine the relationship between FB ToM and
positive reciprocity, in this study we included a Dictator Game
(DG) which took place after the UG. The DG is similar to the
UG in that the allocator is given a sum of incentives (in general,
money) from the experimenter, and is given the opportunity to
split that money between themselves and the recipient in any
manner the allocator desires. Unlike the UG, in the DG the
recipient has no choice whether or not to accept or reject the
offer: they simply receive the amount allocated by the dictator
and nothing more. In the current study, the DG took place after
the UG, and second players were put into the role of the Dictator
to examine their behavior in relation to behavior in the first game.
This design allows us to examine positive responses made by the
second player in the DG after facing fair and unfair offers in
the UG, in addition to rejection behavior in response to fair and
unfair offers made by proposers in the DG.
Previous research suggests that behavior in the DG does not
consistently relate to development of FB ToM. For instance,
Rochat et al. (2009) found that while 5-year-old children
made more pro-social allocations in a DG than 3-year-olds,
allocations in the DG were not significantly predicted by the
ability to understand false beliefs. More recently, Liu et al.
(2016) examined the role of the development of various tasks
assessing the development of ToM in children aged 3–11,
and did not find an association between ToM development
and sharing behavior. In contrast, Cowell et al. (2015) found
that children who had passed a false beliefs task allocated
fewer stickers to an unknown child in another class than
did children who did not pass a false beliefs task3. Thus,
FB ToM may not predict the development of preferences for
fairness, but rather the ability to understand that others will
reject selfish offers. In other words, the ability for cognitive
perspective taking encourages one to behave in a fair manner
not because it increases pro-social preferences, but because
perspective taking allows one to predict how others will respond
to one’s behavior, and behave in manner so as to avoid
rejection.
From models of reciprocity which do not distinguish between
negative and positive reciprocity (e.g., Rabin, 1993), it can be
predicted that the development of FB ToM should increase the
amount of rejections of unfair offers in the UG, as well as
reciprocity in the subsequent DG. However, because results of
previous studies have shown that even young children, who likely
have not acquired FB ToM, frequently reject unfair offers in an
UG (House et al., 2013) we predicted that FB ToM would impact
only positive reciprocity, but not negative reciprocity.
3Interestingly, an earlier study (Benenson et al., 2007) had found that DG
allocations made to a classmate increased with age among children between 4 and
9 years of age, particularly among high SES children, although this study did not
assess ToM. Likewise, studies have shown that found that preschoolers (Fujii et al.,
2015) contributed more in the DG played with strangers only when they were
being watched by an experimenter (see Takagishi et al., 2015, for similar results
with elementary school age boys), or when there is an opportunity for the other
player to reciprocate (Xiong et al., 2016). Similarly, Leimgruber et al. (2012) found
that 5 years-old were more likely to share only when they knew that the recipient
was aware of their donation options. These results support previous work (Castelli
et al., 2014b) suggesting that the development of ToM does not relate directly to
fairness, but rather increases strategic concerns.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
The ethical committee of Tamagawa University approved this
study and consent was obtained in advance from parental
guardians. The methods were carried out in accordance with the
approved guidelines.
Participants
A total of 108 preschoolers (40 boys and 68 girls) from two
preschools in Japan participated in the study in pairs. Children
in two sessions (n = 4) where one or more of the children
did not understand the task or who were not receptive to the
experimenter’s guidance were not included in the study. The
mean age of the remaining samples was 4.4 years (SD = 0.9)
and children were from three classes (first year class: 34 girls and
16 boys, mean age= 3.7, SD= 0.5, second year class: 28 girls and
18 boys, mean age = 4.7, SD = 0.5, third year class: six girls and
six boys, mean age= 6.0, SD= 0.0).
Procedures
Preschoolers were recruited for the experiment during free play
time by teaching staff, and were led to a private room. All children
participated in the experiment in pairs matched by age and
gender. To test for acquisition of ToM, we examined childrens’
understanding of first-order false beliefs using an interactive
animated version of the false beliefs task (FBT) produced by DIK,
Inc.4, based on the Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
Prior to beginning of the game, the experimenter individually
took the participants to an adjacent room to administer the
task on a one-on-one basis using a laptop computer. In this
task, participants view a short animation narrated by a computer
where a child (named “Natsuki” in the Japanese version) stores
a ball in a chest and leaves the room. While Natsuki is out of
the room, another child (named “Yuta”) moves the ball to a new
location. When Natsuki returns, the program asks children where
Natsuki will look for the ball. Participants who have acquired FB
ToM should correctly assume that Natsuki will look in the chest
where she originally stored her ball. On the other hand, children
who have not yet acquired FB ToM will assume that Natsuki will
look in the location where Yuta had moved the ball. Prior to
commencing the Sally-Anne task, the program instructs children
on the vocabulary and objects used in the task (such as the names
of the characters, as well as the words “ball” and “box”), and
children must correctly identify each object before commencing
to the in the task. Participants could respond to the prompt by
pointing, responding verbally, or by nodding or shaking their
head when the computer offered the options “box” or “bag.”
After the FBT, participants played an UG using an apparatus
(shown in Figure 1) which has been used in previous studies
(Takagishi et al., 2010, 2014). Children were randomly assigned to
the role of the first or second player by asking them to sit, facing
each other, on opposing sides of the experimental apparatus.
First, the experimenter explained the UG and experimental
apparatus (Figure 1) to the participants. Colorful fruit-scented
4http://www.kokoro-cd.com/
FIGURE 1 | The apparatus used in the Ultimatum Game (UG). The
proposer sits at the far side and can make an allocation by placing incentives
on each side of the divided tray. The responder sits on the near side of the
apparatus, and can accept the offer by lifting the tray, or reject the offer using
the rejection lever.
erasers, which children highly desired in a pre-experimental pre-
test, were used as incentives. After allowing participants to play
with the apparatus to understand its functions, the experimenter
demonstrated the task by demonstrating all possible divisions of
the erasers by placing the fruit-scented erasers on the divided
tray of the experimental apparatus. The first player could allocate
erasers to herself by placing the erasers on their side of the tray.
Alternatively, players could allocate erasers to the second player
by placing them on the side closest to the other player.
Next, the experimenter instructed the second player, or
responder, on how to accept and reject offers. The second player
could accept an offer from the first player by lifting up the
tray on which the first player had placed the allocated erasers,
in which case the erasers would tumble down a ramp to a
container near each participant according to the first player’s
offer. Conversely, the second player could choose to reject
the offer by pushing down a lever which supported the tray
(rejection lever), causing the erasers to fall into a box and be
confiscated by the experimenter. The experimenter demonstrated
the outcomes associated with all possible combinations of
decisions that could be made by the two players in order
to ensure that participants understood that they would be
able to take home any erasers which fell into their own
containers, and that neither child would receive any erasers
once they fell into the box. The experimenter repeated the
instructions twice and verified children’s understanding by
asking them if they understood the task, and continued as
necessary until he was satisfied that both children understood the
task.
After the instructions, the pair played the UG. The first player
was given two erasers by the experimenter, and was asked to make
a proposal to the second player regarding how to distribute the
erasers by placing them on the tray of the experimental apparatus.
The first player thus could make three possible allocations: keep
both erasers for him/herself, allocate one eraser each, or give
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both erasers to the other player. While participants made their
decisions, the experimenter turned away from the participants
and pretended to be paying close attention to a notebook.
By using two erasers as incentives, this design ensured that
rejection of unfair offers made by proposers would not entail
a cost to the responders. The use of two incentives provides
two advantages: first, it allows us to rule out the role of the
development of numerical competence on proposals. Second, it
allows us to examine only decisions to allocate or not, rather than
the decision of how much to allocate, which have been proposed
to be two distinct mechanisms (e.g., Blake and Rand, 2010; Liu
et al., 2016). After the first player had made their proposal,
the experimenter counted the number of erasers allocated to
each child out loud, and asked the first player to confirm their
allocation. After receiving the confirmation, the experimenter
reminded the second player that they could choose to either lift
up the tray or push down the lever, and waited for the second
player to make their decision. After the second player had made
their decisions, the erasers earned by each participant were put
into a paper bag with the child’s name written on it.
Dictator Game
After completion of the UG the participants played a DG.
The experimenter removed the experimental apparatus used in
the UG and set it aside, leaving only the trays which served
as receptacles behind. The experimenter then informed the
second player that it was time to play another game. In this
game, the second player would decide how to allocate two
more erasers between themselves by placing the erasers directly
on their own tray and/or the other participant’s tray. The
experimenter demonstrated all possible allocations to the second
player before handing the child the erasers, and directed his
attention away from the children and to a notebook. Again,
participants were informed that they would be able to take home
any erasers which ended up in their own tray, and the first
player would not be able to accept or reject the offer. Participants
were not informed of this DG prior to the completion of
the UG.
Relationship Quality
As students engaged in the games in a face to face setting without
anonymity, the quality of the relationship between the students
playing the games with one another may have an impact on
allocation and rejection behavior. Thus, to examine any potential
impact of relationship quality on behavior, we asked the children’s
home room instructor at their preschool to rate the quality of
the relationship between the two children who participated in
each game on a scale of 1 (very bad relationship) to 7 (very good
relationship).
RESULTS
Theory of Mind
Fifty-three of the 104 participants (51%) passed the FBT. The
FBT passage rate was positively correlated with age in months
(r = 0.50, p< 0.0001).
Theory of Mind and Behavior in the
Ultimatum Game
First, we examined whether FB ToM related to allocations
made by proposers in the UG. Already, several studies
(Takagishi et al., 2010, 2014) have found that the development
of FB ToM has a positive effect on allocations in
the UG. Replicating the results of these studies, participants who
had acquired ToM offered more erasers to the second player
(β= 0.41, p= 0.0028). This result weakened (β= 0.30, p= 0.07)
when controlling for gender, age in months, and relationship
quality. As shown in Table 1, allocations were lower among pairs
of boys than among pairs of girls5 (β = −0.31, p = 0.0203). The
effects of age in months and relationship quality on allocations
made by proposers in the UG were not significant (Table 1).
5Note, however, that because pairs were matched by gender, we cannot determine
whether gender effects are driven by the gender of the proposer, responder,
or a combination of both. Indeed, one recent study demonstrated that gender
stereotypes related to the responder influenced proposers allocations in an UG
(Fabre et al., 2016), suggesting that the responder’s gender can potentially play a
role in influencing the proposer’s allocations.
TABLE 1 | Relation between assessed variables and UG allocations.
Independent variables b SE β t p
Age in months 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.65 0.336
Gender (0 = girl, 1 = boy) −0.34 0.14 −0.31 2.40 0.020
FBT (0 = failed, 1 = passed) 0.32 0.18 0.30 1.84 0.072
Relationship quality 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.34 0.733
TABLE 2 | Logistic regression predicting the rejection of unfair offers by responders in the Ultimatum Game.
Independent variables b SE Wald Chi2 p OR 95%CL
Age in months 0.08 0.07 1.57 0.210 1.09 0.954–1.236
Gender (0 = girl, 1 = boy) 1.21 1.12 1.17 0.280 3.37 0.374–30.33
FBT (0 = failed, 1 = passed) −2.69 1.45 3.44 0.064 0.07 0.004–1.165
Relationship quality −1.32 0.68 3.72 0.054 0.27 0.070–1.021
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TABLE 3 | The impact of ToM and control variables on allocations in the Dictator Game following the Ultimatum Game.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
B SE(B) β B SE(B) β B SE(B) β
FBT (passed = 1) 0.44 (0.15) 0.40∗∗ 0.29 (0.13) 0.27∗ −0.02 (0.14) −0.02
Age in months 0.01 (0.01) 0.12 0.00 (0.01) −0.01 0.00 (0.01) 0.02
Gender (boy = 1) −0.24 (0.14) −0.22† −0.01 (0.12) −0.01 −0.05 (0.11) −0.04
Relationship quality 0.06 (0.07) 0.12 0.03 (0.06) 0.05 0.02 (0.05) 0.04
UG offer 0.65 (0.12) 0.60∗∗∗ 0.26 (0.16) 0.24
ToM × UG offer 0.61 (0.17) 0.60∗∗∗
Intercept −0.32 (0.46) −0.06 (0.37) 0.02 (0.33)
R2 0.25 0.53 0.63
†p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Next, we examined whether FB ToM predicted rejection
behavior by the second player in the UG. Of the 27 fair and
generous offers, 25 were accepted (93%), while 8 of 25 unfair
offers (32%) were rejected (Fisher’s exact test; p = 0.036). As
shown in Table 2, FB ToM had a negative, albeit marginal,
effect on rejection of unfair offers Wald χ2 (df = 1) = 3.44,
p = 0.06, consistent with the results of a previous study which
found that the acquisition of FB ToM corresponded positively
with acceptance of unfair UG offers (Takagishi et al., 2014).
Theory of Mind and Allocation Behavior
in the Dictator Game
Finally, we examined whether the development of FB ToM
had any impact on allocation behavior in the DG immediately
following the UG. First, we conducted a regression analysis
examining the impact of FB ToM, gender, and relationship
quality on allocation behavior. The results shown on the left panel
of Table 3, showed that the acquisition of ToM was positively
related to allocation behavior in the DG β = 0.44, p = 0.006, and
that allocations were lower among pairs of boys than among pairs
of girls β = −0.24, p = 0.09, while no effects of age in months or
relationship quality were observed.
However, the purpose of the DG in the current study was
not to examine the effect of the understanding of false beliefs on
allocation behavior in the DG, but to examine the effect of ToM
on reciprocal behavior above and beyond accepting or rejecting
offers made by first players in the UG. Because the DG was
played immediately following the UG, allocations made are not
a pure measure of prosociality, but rather a further measure of
reciprocity. Thus, to examine whether the development of ToM
had any impact on positive or negative reciprocity in the DG, we
included the offer made by the first player in the UG preceding
the DG (no erasers offered = 0; 1 or more erasers offered = 1)
in the second step of the above regression analysis, controlling
for gender, age in months, and relationship quality. The results
indicated that the first player’s offer in the UG had a significant
impact on the second player’s allocation as a dictator in the
DG (β = 0.60, p < 0.0001), while the effect of ToM remained
significant (β= 0.27, p= 0.0235).
Finally, we examined whether the effect of ToM on allocation
behavior in the DG was dependent on whether the dictator
(second player) had been offered at least one eraser by the first
player in the preceding UG. To do so, in the third step we
input the ToM × UG offer interaction term in the final step,
shown in the third panel of Table 3. The results showed that the
interaction term was significant (β= 0.60, p= 0.0009). Counts of
participants who made fair and unfair DG offers after receiving
fair and unfair UG offers, by FB ToM passage status, are shown
in Figure 2. For children who faced a fair or hyperfair offer in
the UG, acquisition of FB ToM significantly predicted fair offers
in the DG. However, for children who had faced an unfair offer
FB ToM did not significantly predict whether or not children
allocated an eraser to the other player. Thus, FB ToM predicted
DG allocations in cases of positive reciprocity, and was unrelated
to negative reciprocity.
DISCUSSION
The studies presented above examine the impact of ToM,
necessary to understand the intentions of others, on positive and
negative reciprocity. Consistent with the results of a previous
study examining children’s decisions in an UG (Takagishi et al.,
2014), the rejection of unfair offers in the UG was not observed
more frequently among children who had acquired ToM, as
assessed by a FBT. Furthermore, the current study found that
children who had acquired ToM were not more likely to respond
to unfair offers in an UG with selfish offers in a DG, in which
children were given the option to allocate resources between
themselves and a partner in any way they pleased. The results
of this study, taken together with null and mixed findings
related to rejection of unfair offers in the UG observed in
previous studies (e.g., Takagishi et al., 2014) suggest that negative
reciprocity may be unrelated to the development of FB ToM in
preschool children. Regardless of whether they had passed a FBT,
children were likely to reject unfair offers and made less equitable
allocations in a subsequent DG after being faced with an unfair
offer in the UG.
At the same time, this study suggests that ToM plays a role in
positive reciprocity: only children who passed the FBT responded
to a fair offer in the UG with a fair offer of their own as dictators in
the DG. This result suggests that while ToM may not be needed to
punish or retaliate against negative behavior, it may increase the
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FIGURE 2 | Counts of participants, by FB ToM passage, who made fair and unfair offers in the Dictrator Game(DG) following the UG. Counts on the left
show number of participants in each category who faced fair offers, and counts on the right in parentheses show counts for participants who faced unfair offers.
tendency for children to respond to being treated in an equitable
manner with fair behavior of their own. While the importance of
intentions in determining negative reciprocity has been observed
in adults, it may be that the ability to inhibit the initial response to
reject unfair offers or retaliate against unfair offers may develop
later in adolescence (e.g., Gürogˇlu et al., 2009, 2011).
This study is not without limitation. One limitation is that
the nature of the assessment of FB ToM was dichotomous
(i.e., passed/not passed). Future studies should also examine
additional measures of cognitive development that are able to
account for nuances in the degree to which children have an
understanding of false beliefs which may allow for a more
detailed interpretation of the impact of FB ToM on positive
and negative reciprocity. Studies could seek to examine the
development of various components related to ToM, such as
second-order FB ToM (e.g., Castelli et al., 2014a,b), perspective
taking ability (e.g., Keysar et al., 2003; Fett et al., 2014), and
emotional understanding (e.g., Takagishi et al., 2014) on positive
and negative reciprocity.
Further research should also attempt to reconcile differences
between the results of this and other studies that show that the
development of FB ToM in preschoolers is associated with the
emerge of strategic behavior in economic games (e.g., Takagishi
et al., 2010, 2014), and studies investigating similar tendencies
observed in infants and toddlers. Studies of infants show that
not only do infants have some understanding of false beliefs and
intentions (e.g., Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Helming et al.,
2014), but that toddlers will also behave in a positive manner
toward those who are prosocial, and behave in a negative manner
to those who exhibit anti-social behavior (Hamlin et al., 2011).
One potential explanation for differences between these studies
may involve the willingness of children to give up their personal
resources: in this study (as well as many other studies examining
prosocial behavior of children in the context of economic games)
children must give up their own resources to benefit another, thus
future research should examine whether passage of a FBT relates
to costly and costless rewarding behavior. In the case of the UG
used in this study, rejecting an unfair offer did not incur a cost
to participants. In the DG, however, providing one’s partner with
an eraser required children to give up a resource that they could
have otherwise kept for themselves. Given that prior research has
not found consistent evidence linking acquisition of FB ToM with
greater allocations in the DG, the finding that DG allocations
made after receiving a fair offer in the UG corresponds with the
development of FB ToM merits future investigation.
Future studies should further examine the relation between
the development of cognitive abilities such as ToM and
positive and negative reciprocity using paradigms other than the
combination of the UG and DG employed in this study. Indeed,
in this study, all participants who accepted unfair offers in the
UG allocated both erasers to themselves in the DG, suggesting
that even children who accepted unfair offers did not feel that
they were treated fairly. The finding may also indicate that
children prefer equal outcomes overall. Future studies should be
conducted to delineate these and other possibilities. Additionally,
this study employed a relatively small sample of participants
from a developed country (Japan). Although studies suggest that
the development of fairness in young children follows similar
trajectories across diverse cultures (e.g., Rochat et al., 2009;
Robbins et al., 2015), and that aversion to unfairness toward
oneself is found across a number of cultures (Blake et al., 2015),
future studies should examine the development of positive and
negative reciprocity in larger and more diverse samples.
Overall, this study provides further support for the notion
that positive and negative reciprocity are distinct processes (e.g.,
Yamagishi et al., 2012; Egloff et al., 2013) by showing that the
cognitive mechanisms associated with positive reciprocity are not
associated with negative reciprocity in preschool-aged children.
This approach highlights the utility of examining developmental
trajectories in understanding the nature of social decision making
in humans (e.g., Gummerum et al., 2008). While the results of this
study are preliminary, we hope that future research will examine
the role of cognitive abilities and their relation to positive and
negative reciprocity over development.
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